Opinion: The Ukrainian Fight for Global Sovereignty
By Anna Lysenko, 2021–2022 IRSOC Blogger
I am Ukrainian. Although I have not lived in Ukraine for over 14 years, I still have family there, I still have a Ukrainian passport, and I am still deeply concerned about the ongoing Russian military escalation. My Ukrainian identity and context give me passion, while my distance from the situation and my education give me a clear, broad understanding of events that have global implications for politics and state sovereignty.
Before anything else is said, I must clarify: I am not anti-Russian. For some time after 2014, I would get personally offended when someone called me Russian. Now I still correct people but I’m much more easy going about it. After all, Russia and Ukraine have been intertwined since around 882 AD, when the Kyivan Rus was formed (Makuch 2021). Ideas of Ukrainian independence have risen and fallen since the 16th century, and Ukraine got close to it a few times, including in 1918 after the Russian Empire collapsed. However, the rise of the Soviet Union overpowered Ukrainian nationalism, and Ukraine suffered under Stalin’s Holodomor, WW2, and Chernobyl (Makuch 2021). After the collapse of the USSR, the nations within it were declared independent. End of story? No. Although Ukraine, along with many other countries, was granted independence, the Russian state never truly accepted the idea of Ukrainian independence (Andrejsons 2022). Like a long-term ex-boyfriend, Russia was sure that Ukraine leaving the Union was just a phase, and that soon Ukraine would realize what it was missing and come right back to join its Russian brothers. No one epitomizes this mindset more than Vladimir Putin, the current Russian president. The 2014 annexation of Crimea and the subsequent sending of the “Little Green Men” into Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region demonstrated his determination to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and drag it back into antiquity (Kuzio 2022). I was angry at what happened in 2014. I’m not angry anymore. Well, sometimes I am, but since I started to study global politics in high school, I have gained a far greater understanding of Putin’s motivations. Here’s a list of some potential explanations (Andrejsons 2022; Gasparini 2021; Green 2014; Harris 2022):
- Keep Ukraine away from democratization, therefore making Russians question their own living situation
- Following point #1, counterbalance NATO and the EU’s expansion after the 90s
- Move one step closer to bringing back the “good old days” of the Soviet Union
- Gain unimpeded access to the Black Sea, for trade and military security
- Improve public approval ratings
- “Protect ethnic Russians”
Recently, there has been a considerable military escalation on Ukraine’s eastern border, with over 100,000 Russian troops arriving, and military bases being set up (Kirby and Guyer 2022). Thus, it’s more important than ever to consider two things: firstly, why now? It has been 8 years since Russia annexed Crimea and sent in the Little Green Men. Since then, fighting has been bloody and ongoing, with no clear end in sight. Is it just that Putin has grown tired of the conflict, and wants a quick, full-scale invasion of Ukraine? Or has Ukraine’s renewed attempts at forging closer ties to Europe given Putin the clear signal that Ukraine will never willingly conform to his Soviet dream? Plausibly, Putin could have recognized the fruitfulness of the moment: the US is currently preoccupied on two fronts, as it aims to contain both Russia in Ukraine and China in Taiwan (Myers and Troianovski 2022; The Economist Leaders 2022). Ultimately, it could be a combination of these factors.
The second question that comes to mind is much more pressing: what next? Three potential scenarios have been circulated. The first scenario is that Russia completely invades Ukraine, overtaking the capital, Kyiv. Due to the sheer volume of troops and machinery that has been moved towards Ukraine by Russia, a full-scale invasion appears possible (Kirby and Guyer 2022). However, it would be costly, and I believe it is unlikely. If Russia truly does invade Ukraine, the consequences could be World War 3. Neither the US nor its allies would stand for such a blatant disregard for Ukrainian sovereignty, as the US and Europe have demonstrated their allegiance with Ukraine (Dixon, Pannett, Harris, and Parker 2022). Internally, Russia knows it cannot afford a full-scale war, although it might be ready for it: in memos recovered from the Kremlin, it was revealed that Russian officials fear Putin has overestimated Russian forces and underestimated the West’s military and economic power (Hassan 2022). Thus, although an attack on Ukraine does seem possible at first glance, considering the implications of such an invasion on global politics makes it seem much less likely.
The second scenario is still an invasion, but one of smaller size: Russia could invade Ukraine’s East, under the guise of protecting ethnic Russians. The US government has claimed it has evidence of a Russian false flag operation that included a video of Russians calling on Russia to “rescue” them (Barnes 2022). Taking Ukraine’s East could be plausible with the number of forces Russia has at its disposal. However, here Russia would face the same problems as before, mainly fierce military and economic retaliation from Ukraine, the US, and Europe (Barnes 2022; Dixon, Pannett, Harris, and Parker 2022).
The third scenario is that talks will continue until there is an agreement of de-escalation, in return for the West paying more attention to Russia’s security concerns. Life would return to a stability and normalcy, with continued small-scale clashes on Ukraine’s eastern border. This is considered a likely scenario by many, including myself, although I remain cautious (Harris 2022; The Economist Leaders 2022). The sheer size of the operation is puzzling: wouldn’t 20,000 military personnel be enough for an attention grab? Either way, this scenario would be a level-headed ending to the escalation, although I hope that during negotiations, the West will continue to firmly support Ukraine’s democratic aspirations.
One solution to the current situation could be to get UN peacekeepers to the Eastern border. The presence of UN troops would significantly de-escalate the situation and act as a catalyst to the disarmament of both sides: there could be hope of the Little Green Men leaving, and Ukrainians getting long-deserved peace and stability (Bilous 2022). Furthermore, UN involvement would affirm Ukraine’s sovereign place on the international democratic stage. It would also improve Russia’s global political, moral, and social standing, allowing it to de-escalate while keeping its dignity. Finally, involving the UN would revitalize the international liberal order itself, and affirm the necessity of international institutions for peacemaking (Ikenberry 2020). Still, although this seems like an ideal solution, it may be unrealistic; Ukraine has called for UN peacekeepers many times before, yet action was vetoed by Russia and China (Bilous 2022).
The current Ukrainian situation troubles me not just because I’m Ukrainian. It troubles me because I am an international relations student, and this is a crisis of sovereignty. If Russia invades, there would not only be WW3, but also a decisive return to an 18th-century global order, where the nation with the strongest military is the most powerful and is not held accountable by international laws, norms, or morality (Ikenberry 2020; The Economist Leaders 2022). The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was already a failure of sovereignty: the world did not do enough to protect a principle that is at the core of modern politics. Today, at a moment of unprecedented uncertainty about Ukraine’s future, the world must play its part in full by giving Ukraine all the military, economic, and diplomatic support it needs. Negotiations with Russia must send a clear message: stay within your borders because if you don’t, your forces will be repelled faster than you can say borscht. In spite of its history and current flaws, Ukraine is a strong, independent European nation with democratic aspirations. It is called home by 41 million people with a right to dream of living in a free, safe country, and not fear an invasion from a neighbour they once called a brother (Andrejsons 2022; Harris 2022). Many predict that Ukraine will become a battleground in the coming months. I say it already is one. It is a battle for rights, of the people and the state. It is a battle for progress and aspirations. It is a battle for sovereignty.
I can only hope that the world will win this one.
Most sincerely,
Anna Lysenko
Bibliography:
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